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A COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS OF MOST
FAVORED NATIONS CLAUSES IN
CONTRACTS BETWEEN HEALTH CARE
PROVIDERS AND INSURERS
ARNOLD CELNICKER*
A most favored nations (MFN) clause is a contractual agreement
between a buyer and a seller stating that the price paid by the buyer will
be at least as low as the price paid by other buyers who purchase the
same commodities from the seller. During the past decade the anticom-
petitive impact of MFN clauses in the health care industry has been
challenged under federal antitrust law& The cases have considered
MFN clauses included in contracts between large third-party payers,
specifically Blue Cross and Blue Shield (BCBS) plans, and providers of
health care. The clauses prohibit providers from selling their medical
services to BCBS's competitors at a price lower than the price at which
they sell to BCBS. The cases have challenged these clauses on the
grounds that they limit selective discounting to the competitors thereby
making it difficult for the competitors to attract subscribers from domi-
nant BCBS plans by lowering premiums. In this Article, Professor
Celnicker asserts that MFN clauses have significant anticompetitive po-
tentiaL The Article examines the competitive consequences of MFN
clauses used in the health care industry. The Article's analysis draws
heavily from the economic criticisms of the Robinson-Patman Act, which
prohibits a seller from discriminating in price between customers in cer-
tain circumstances. The Article concludes that in certain circumstances,
MFN clauses discourage discounting, facilitate oligopolistic pricing and
deter entry or expansion by more efficient distribution systems
I. INTRODUCTION
A clause in the contract between Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Rhode
Island (BCBSRI) and doctors prohibited the doctors from lowering their prices
to any of their patients without also lowering their prices to BCBSRI subscrib-
ers. In Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of
Rhode Island,' the doctors charged that this clause, called a "most favored na-
tions" clause, was anticompetitive and violated the federal antitrust laws. The
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected the doctors' argu-
ment, characterizing it as "silly." 2
* Assistant Professor, College of Business, and Adjunct Professor for Antitrust, College of
Law, The Ohio State University. The author thanks Bruce Seaman for his valuable contributions to
the economic analysis and David Leonard for his research assistance.
1. 883 F.2d 1101 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1473 (1990).
2. Id. at 1110 (quoting Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield
of LI., 692 F. Supp. 52, 71 (D.R.I. 1988)).
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This Article will analyze the competitive impact of most favored nations
(MFN) clauses and establish that they do, in fact, have anticompetitive poten-
tial. This Article defines an MFN clause as a contractual agreement between a
buyer and a seller that the price paid by the buyer will be at least as low as the
price paid by other buyers who purchase the same commodities from the seller. 3
Only during the past decade has the possible anticompetitive impact of MFN
clauses been challenged under federal antitrust laws.
In the early 1980s the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) brought a test case
aimed at establishing that MFN clauses, accompanied by certain other practices,
could facilitate tacit collusion in an oligopolistic industry.4 The FTC found that
MFN clauses facilitated oligopolistic pricing.5 The Commission cited evidence
that the clauses limited price discounting because the manufacturer would have
to give any discount to all customers. 6 However, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the FrC's finding and labeled MFN
clauses a legitimate business practice.7
Although the use of MFN clauses undoubtedly has continued in a number
of industries, recent private antitrust litigation challenging the anticompetitive
effects of these clauses has focused on the health care industry. The cases have
considered MFN clauses included in contracts between large third-party payers,
specifically Blue Cross and Blue Shield (BCBS) plans, and providers of health
care, such as doctors, dentists, and hospitals. The clauses prohibit providers
from selling their medical services to BCBS's competitors at a price lower than
the price at which they sell to BCBS. The cases have challenged these clauses on
the grounds that they limit selective discounting to the competitors and thus
make it difficult for the competitors to attract subscribers from dominant BCBS
plans by lowering premiums.8
During the 1980s, one federal circuit court,9 two federal district courts, 10
and two state courts1 rejected such antitrust attacks on MFN clauses. More-
over, both federal antitrust enforcement agencies, the FTC and the Antitrust
3. Other terms used to describe the same concept include "most favored customer," "most
favored buyer," "price protection," and "nondiscrimination" clauses.
4. In re Ethyl Corp., 101 F.T.C. 425 (1983), rev'dsub nom. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984).
5. Id. at 625-26.
6. Id.
7. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 139-40 (2d Cir. 1984).
8. See Baker, Vertical Restraints Among Hospitals, Physicians and Health Insurers that Raise
Rivals' Costs, 14 AM. J.L. & MED. 147, 154-68 (1988); Note, Most-Favored-Nation Clauses and
Monopsonistic Power: An Unhealthy Mix?, 15 AM. J.L. & MED. 111, 117-27 (1989).
9. Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of R.I., 883 F.2d
1101 (Ist Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1473 (1990) For a discussion of this case, see infra text
accompanying notes 73-87.
10. Kitsap Physicians Serv. v. Washington Dental Serv., 671 F. Supp. 1267 (W.D. Wash. 1987)
(For a discussion of this case, see infra text accompanying notes 67-72.); Blue Cross and Blue Shield
of Mich. v. Michigan Ass'n of Psychotherapy Clinics, 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 63,351 (E.D.
Mich. 1980) (For a discussion of this case, see infira text accompanying notes 48-54.).
11. Michigan Ass'n of Psychotherapy Clinics v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Mich., 118
Mich. App. 505, 325 N.W.2d 471 (1982) (For a discussion of this case, see infra text accompanying
note 54.); Madden v. California Dental Serv., 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) % 67,176 (Cal. Super. Ct.
1986) (For a discussion of this case, see infra text accompanying notes 55-66.).
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Division of the United States Department of Justice, have indicated a general
unwillingness to challenge the use of MFN clauses in the health care industry.1 2
The support for MFN clauses is based primarily on the idea that requiring any
lower price given to buyer A also be given to buyer B is not only fair to buyer B,
but also leads to the spreading of lower prices throughout the market.
More recently, however, Reazin v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas,
Inc. 13 became the first court opinion to paint MFN clauses in an anticompeti-
tive light. According to the court's analysis, MFN clauses create a disincentive
for the provider to give a discount to a BCBS competitor because the discount
would have to be given to BCBS also. The disincentive to discount, in turn,
makes entry into the market by competitors more difficult.
This Article examines the competitive consequences of MFN clauses, focus-
ing on their use in the health care industry. Part II of the Article reviews the
FTC's test case, In re Ethyl Corp.14 Part III provides background regarding the
relevant economic changes that have been occurring in the health care industry
since the 1970s and presents the cases that have challenged MFN clauses in that
context. Part IV analyzes the competitive effects of MFN clauses. The analysis
draws heavily from economic criticisms of the Robinson-Patman Act,15 which
prohibits a seller from discriminating in price between customers in certain cir-
cumstances. This analysis leads to the conclusion, presented in Part V, that
MFN clauses have significant anticompetitive potential.
12. Between 1984 and 1986, the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice
conducted investigations involving MFN clauses in contracts between providers and Blue Cross of
Idaho, Blue Cross of Kansas City, and Dental Service Corporation of North Dakota. (Documents
obtained by the author pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request.) No actions resulted. In
1988, the head of the Antitrust Division stated that the Division was "unlikely" to challenge MFN
clauses between third-party payers and providers. He did state, however, that:
when the third-party payer supplies at least 35 percent of the business of providers in the
market-a function of the number of providers contracting with the payer and the impor-
tance of the payer to each provider-further analysis is warranted. Among the questions
the Department is likely to ask in assessing such a clause's competitive effect are whether
the imposition of the clause was motivated by factors other than the desire to get the best
price possible and whether there is sufficient available capacity for a new third-party payer
to enter the market.
Remarks at the Antitrust and Health Care Seminar of the Antitrust Section of the Connecticut Bar
Association and the Connecticut Health Lawyers Association 24 (March 11, 1988) [hereinafter Re-
marks] (Statement by C.F. Rule).
Between 1984 and 1986, the Federal Trade Commission conducted at least two inquiries involv-
ing MFN clauses in provider contracts. (Documents obtained by the author pursuant to a Freedom
of Information Act request.) No actions were taken. Moreover, the FTC declined to support Ocean
State's petition for certiorari in Ocean State, where the First Circuit found MFN clauses to be
procompetitive. See infra text accompanying notes 73-87.
13. 899 F.2d 951 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 110 S. CL 3241 (1990) For a discussion of this case,
see infra text accompanying notes 88-109.
14. 101 F.T.C. 425 (1983), rev'd sub nom. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d
128 (2d Cir. 1984).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1988).
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II. IN RE ETHYL CORP. 16
In 1979, the Federal Trade Commission issued an administrative complaint
against the only four manufacturers of antiknock compounds.17 The complaint
alleged that certain marketing practices used in an oligopolistic setting reduced
uncertainty about prices, thereby facilitating price uniformity and reducing price
competition. 18 One of these marketing practices was the use of MFN clauses.19
The Commission concluded that MFN clauses reduced the incentive to dis-
count.20 If the manufacturer provided a discount to one customer, it was con-
tractually bound to give the discount to all its customers. The direct effect of
discounting would be to reduce the manufacturer's profits, unless the lower
prices attracted sufficient new customers to offset the reduced revenues caused
by its lower prices. The prospect of that occurring is not great, however, if the
other oligopolists learn of the discounting because they, too, would lower their
prices. Given that MFN clauses require the discount be given to all customers,
it is unlikely that such widespread discounting could be kept secret from the
other oligopolists. Realizing this, the manufacturer is unlikely to discount in the
first instance. Moreover, each oligopolist can be reasonably certain its rivals will
view the situation the same way and opt not to discount. Therefore, the Com-
mission concluded that price uncertainty, which can destabilize oligopolistic
pricing, is reduced.21
The manufacturers argued that customers desired MFN clauses to ensure
that they were not disadvantaged in relation to other customers. 22 They con-
tended that MFN clauses actually were consistent with the policy of the Robin-
son-Patman Act, 23 which prohibits a seller from discriminating in price between
16. 101 F.T.C. 425 (1983), rev'd sub nom. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d
128 (2d Cir. 1984).
17. Id. The four manufacturers were Ethyl, Du Pont, PPG, and Nalco. Id. at 426-27.
18. Id. at 427-28.
19. Ethyl's MWN clause stated: "If Ethyl sells a compound of equal quantity and quality at
price lower than that provided for herein to any oil company in the United States, BUYER shall pay
such lower price on all shipments of such compound made hereunder while such lower price is in
effect." Id. at 471. Do Pont, and occasionally Nalco, had similar MFN clauses in their contracts,
while PPG did not use MFN clauses. Id. at 471-72.
The other three practices challenged in the complaint were the exclusive use of delivered pric-
ing, the inclusion of clauses requiring 30-days advance notice of price changes in contracts, and the
provision of more than 30-days advance notice of price changes through the press and to customers.
Id. at 427-28.
20. Id. at 628-3 1.
21. Id. The Commission also noted that oligopolistic pricing would be stabilized by MFN
clauses because the manufacturer could justify rejecting a customer's request for a discount by ex-
plaining to the customer that the MFN clause would require it to give the discount to all its custom-
ers. Id. at 630.
22. Id. at 632.
23. Subject to certain jurisdictional requirements and defenses, the Robinson-Patman Act
makes it unlawful
to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities ... where the effect of
such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monop-
oly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person
who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with custom.
ers of either of them ....
15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988).
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customers in certain circumstances. The Commission, however, rejected the
analogy to the Robinson-Patman Act. The Act bans only price discriminations
that are not cost justified and that are not given in good faith to meet an equally
low price of a competitor, whereas MTN clauses ban all price discriminations. 24
Moreover, the Commission dismissed the customers' desire for equal prices,
finding that the benefits of a competitively performing market outweigh the cus-
tomers' preference.2 5
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the Commission's finding of a viola-
tion.2 6 Although the court's discussion of MFN clauses is terse, it indicates that
the Commission's findings were not supported by record evidence. 27 According
to the court's view of the evidence, MFN clauses were adopted simply to assure
small customers that "they would not be placed at a competitive disadvantage to
giants such as Standard Oil, Texaco and Gulf.' 28 Although the Court labeled
this reason a "legitimate business reason," 29 it did not address why, absent altru-
ism, a profit-maximizing seller would adopt such a policy. The court failed to
recognize that if a seller can engage in price discrimination, it can increase its
profits. 30 Therefore, a seller contractually would not agree to MEN clauses and
thus forego price discrimination, unless the MFN clauses enhanced profits more
than the price discrimination would enhance profits. The only way MFN clauses
might significantly enhance profits is by reducing discounting and price uncer-
tainty, as explained by the Commission. 31
Despite the court's conclusion that the Commission's analysis was not sup-
ported by 6vidence, the court recognized the potential anticompetitive effect of
MFN clauses. The court stated that, "[e]ven though such clauses arguably re-
duce price discounting, they comport with the requirements of the Robinson-
Patman Act,... which prohibits price discrimination between customers." 32 In
the extreme, this sentence can be read as immunizing MFN clauses from anti-
trust attack as a matter of law because they comport with the Robinson-Patman
Act. However, such a reading would make the court's consideration of the rea-
son for the MFN clauses irrelevant. It is more likely that the court was simply
bolstering its conclusion that, within the context of the instant case, there was no
antitrust violation. The analogy between MFN clauses and the Robinson-Pat-
man Act, which is central to this Article, is considered in Part V.
The court's analysis of MFN clauses is not satisfying. Its brevity and weak-
ness most likely reflect the legal context of the case. Ethyl was a test case on the
reach of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits "un-
24. See infra notes 159-68 and accompanying text.
25. Ethyl, 101 F.T.C. at 632.
26. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984).
27. Id. at 134.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See L. PHLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION 7 (1983).
31. For a discussion of the Commission's analysis, see supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
32. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 1984).
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fair methods of competition. '33 Unlike almost all other antitrust cases, there
was no allegation of an "agreement" that unreasonably restrained trade, or of
monopolization. 34 The court was unwilling to find that section 5 reaches unilat-
eral practices engaged in for "legitimate business reasons" and without an an-
ticompetitive purpose. 35 Although the policy concerns that shaped the court's
view of the limits of section 5 are beyond the scope of this Article, the court's
treatment of MFN clauses likely was tailored to fit within that view.
III. THE USE OF MOST FAVORED NATIONS CLAUSES IN THE HEALTH
CARE INDUSTRY
With the exception of Ethyl, the major antitrust challenges to MFN clauses
have been in the context of the health care industry. Before reviewing those
cases in Part IIIB of the Article, Part IIIA summarizes some of the significant
changes that have reshaped the health care delivery system over the past decade.
A working knowledge of those changes is a prerequisite to understanding the
role of MFN clauses in the industry.
A. The Changing Competitive Environment in Health Care
Historically, consumers have had to make two independent decisions re-
garding the purchase of health care services. First, they have had to choose a
health insurance plan, often a BCBS plan, to reimburse the cost of specified
expenses. Second, they have had to choose doctors, dentists, hospitals, and
others to provide the health care itself. These providers then were reimbursed
by the consumer's insurance plan based on the providers' fees for the services
rendered. 36
Starting in the 1970s, a consensus developed that this traditional insurance
system not only failed to control the cost of health care, but actually fostered
waste and inefficiency. 37 Moral hazard-"the higher costs that result when nor-
mal economizing incentives are diluted by the opportunity to risk or spend an-
other's funds" 38-was a major problem. It was in the subscriber's self-interest
33. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1988).
34. The Commission opted not to allege any "agreement" among the competing oligopolists in
its Ethyl complaint. Instead, the case examined unilaterally adopted marketing practices that alleg-
edly facilitated oligopolistic pricing. Professor Areeda has noted an alternative way to frame the
antitrust issue. He states that MFN clauses "are embodied in a buyer-seller contract which has the
effect of restraining the seller's freedom of action in other transactions. Such a contract might itself
be examined under Sherman Act § I as an unreasonable restraint of trade." 6 P. AREEDA, ANTI-
TRUST LAW 1435e, at 231 (1986). Therefore, rather than focusing on horizontal collusion among
competitors, the vertical agreement embodied in the contract itself might be analyzed under the
antitrust laws.
35. Du Pont, 729 F.2d at 139-40.
36. See, eg., Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1329-30 (7th
Cir. 1986); Baker, supra note 8, at 147-48; Frech, Preferred Provider Organizations and Health Care
Competition, in HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 353, 355 (H. Frech & R. Zeckhauser ed. 1988).
37. See, eg., Baker, supra note 8, at 152; Havighurst, The Questionable Cost-Containment Rec-
ord of Commercial Health Insurers, in HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 221, 248-49 (H. Frech & R.
Zeckhauser eds. 1988); Pauly, Overinsurance: The Conceptual Issues, in NATIONAL HEALTH INSUR-
ANCE: WHAT Now, WHAT LATER, WHAT NEVER? 201, 201 (M. Pauly ed. 1980).
38. Havighurst, supra note 37, at 222.
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to seek out health care whenever the benefit to the subscriber was greater than
the cost. The cost to the subscriber, however, was often minimal because the
insurer reimbursed most expenses. Similarly, the provider's economic interests
were served by providing more care, since the fees were paid by the insurer.
Thus, neither the consumer-buyer nor the provider-seller had an incentive to
economize.
Employers and the government primarily bore the ever-increasing costs of
health care. Those paying the costs had few options, however, as long as the
BCBS traditional insurance system was practically the only health care delivery
system available. The search for options intensified as health care costs grew.3 9
During the 1980s, the health maintenance organization (HMO)4° and the pre-
ferred provider organization (PPO)4 1 emerged as substantial alternatives to
traditional insurance plans. Although HMOs and PPOs vary in organizational
format, they all differ from traditional insurance in that they integrate, to vary-
ing degrees, the insurance function and the provider function into a single entity.
For a predetermined fee, they provide specified medical services. Thus, HMOs
and PPOs increase their profits by reducing their costs. One of the primary
ways they reduce costs is by contracting with a limited number of providers who
agree to provide services subject to peer review or other limiting mechanisms,
and to do so at a reasonable or discounted fee.42
The emergence of HMOs and PPOs threatened, for the first time, BCBS's
role in the health care delivery system. In response, many BCBS plans organ-
ized their own HMOs and PPOs.43 However, they also continued to offer their
traditional insurance plans. To ensure that those traditional plans did not pay
39. See Gabel, Jajich-Toth, Williams, Loughran & Haugh, The Commercial Health Insurance
Industry in Transition, 6 HEALTH AFFAIRs 46, 47 (Fall 1987).
40. Professor Havighurst has noted:
HMO arrangements with physicians vary widely. There are, however, three basic types of
HMO: a "staff" model, a "group" model, and an "individual practice association" model.
In the so-called staff model, the HMO employs physicians on a salaried basis; occasionally
such physician/employees have organized a labor union for purposes of collective bargain-
ing. In the group model, the HMO entity contracts for physicians' services with an in-
dependent physician-sponsored entity. In the individual practice association model, the
HMO contracts with independent practitioners individually or in small groups. HMO ar-
rangements with hospitals range from directly owning the hospital, to contracting with
independent hospitals, to using hospitals selected by contracting physicians.
Havighurst, Doctors and Hospitals. An Antitrust Perspective on Traditional Relationships, 1984
DUKE L.J. 1071, 1073 n.3.
41. Professor Frech has described the function of the PPO:
A PPO provides a particular type of health insurance. It contracts with a limited number
of providers-hospitals and/or physicians, to provide care for a particular group of con-
sumers on preferential terms. The PPO stands between a specific, defined group of con-
sumers and a specific, defined group of providers. Consumers are offered better terms
(more complete insurance and possibly price discounts and/or utilization controls) if they
patronize the preferred providers-hence the name. PPOs can be, and have been, organ-
ized by the providers, insurance companies, or employers.
Frech, supra note 36, at 354.
42. See id.; Rolph, Ginsburg & Hosek, The Regulation of Preferred Provider Arrangements, 6
HEALTH AFFAIRS 32, 34 (Fall 1987).
43. See Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1329-31 (7th Cir.
1986).
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more for provider services than competing HMOs and PPOs paid, some of the
plans employed MFN clauses in their contracts with providers.44 The MFN
clauses prohibited providers from granting, and alternative delivery systems
from receiving, select discounts. Providers and alternative delivery systems then
challenged the legality of MFN clauses under the antitrust laws.
B. Health Care Cases Involving Most Favored Nations Clauses
In all five of the following cases, the basic issue is: What is the competitive
impact of MFN clauses?45 Three of these cases focus on BCBS's employment of
MFN clauses in their traditional plans in response to the new competitive envi-
ronment.4 6 The two remaining cases focus on the use of MFN clauses by large
dental service plans. 47
1. The Michigan Mental Health Providers Cases48
In 1979, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan (BCBSM) proposed new
44. No data exists regarding the prevalence of ME7N clauses in contracts between BCBS and
providers. However, an April 18, 1984, letter from BCBS of Kansas City to hospitals states that
"'Most Favored Nation Clauses' are in many Blue Cross contracts across the country." Letter from
Tom Bowser, Vice President, BCBS of Kansas City, to hospitals (April 18, 1984). (Documents
obtained by the author pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request.) Similarly, a July 23,
1990, letter from The Travelers Companies to the author claims that MFN clauses "are prevalent in
Blue Cross contracts." Letter from James M. Michener to Arnold Celnicker (July 23, 1990) (dis-
cussing the use of the most favored nations clauses in provider contracts). This evidence, in addition
to the cases discussed in the following section of this Article, indicates that MFN clauses are not
uncommon in provider contracts with BCBS. Moreover, it recently was reported that BCBS plans
in Connecticut and Ohio are moving to adopt MFN clauses in physician contracts in the wake of
Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Rhode Island, 883 F.2d
1101 (1st Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1473 (1990). See Health Market Survey 10 (April 20,
1990).
45. Cases involving MFN clauses should be differentiated from cases in which BCBS and prov-
iders enter agreements limiting the charges that providers can collect for services rendered to the
BCBS subscriber. See Barry v. Blue Cross of Cal., 805 F.2d 866, 867 (9th Cir. 1986); Ball Memorial
Hosp., 784 F.2d at 1330; Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 749 F.2d 922, 923 (Ist Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1029 (1985); Medical Arts Pharmacy of Stamford, Inc. v. Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of Conn., Inc., 675 F.2d 502, 503 (2d Cir. 1982); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross of W. Penn.,
481 F.2d 80, 82 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973); see also Chick's Auto Body v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 401 A.2d 722, 725, 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,642 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1979) (insurance company's refusal to pay auto repair shops more than a certain rate),
aff'd, 176 N.J. Super. 320, 423 A.2d 311 (N.J Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980). Unlike MFN cases, these
agreements do not tie the amount that BCBS or its subscriber will pay the provider to the amount
paid by competing insurers to the same provider. Instead, BCBS refuses to pay more than a certain
amount to any provider. This is analogous to a buyer deciding not to pay more than SX for a certain
service. In the MFN situation, BCBS will pay more than $X, if others also pay more; the direct
effect of MFN clauses is price uniformity rather than lower prices. Cf. United Mine Workers of Am.
v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 668 (1965) (An agreement between the United Mine Workers union
and large coal producers to seek uniform labor terms throughout the industry violated antitrust
policy by restraining the sellers of labor from acting "according to their own choice and discretion"
in dealing with other employers.); Associated Milk Dealers, Inc. v. Milk Drivers Union, 422 F.2d
546, 552-53 (7th Cir. 1970) (Under Pennington, an MFN clause in a contract between the union and
dairies aight violate the antitrust laws if it were entered into for a predatory purpose.).
46. See infra texts accompanying notes 48, 73 & 88.
47. See infra texts accompanying notes 55 & 67.
48. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Mich. v. Michigan Ass'n of Psychotherapy Clinics, 1980-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,351 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Michigan Ass'n of Psychotherapy Clinics v. Blue
Cross and Blue Shield of Mich., 118 Mich. App. 505, 325 N.W.2d 471 (1982).
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contracts with providers of mental health services. One of the changes was the
addition of an MFN clause. The clause, dubbed a price nondiscrimination
clause, required that providers bill BCBSM at no more than their charges for
non-BCBSM patients.49 The changes generated two suits, one in federal court
alleging price fixing under section 1 of the Sherman Act 50 and the other in state
court alleging price fixing under Michigan's antitrust law.51
In the federal action, the court granted summary judgment in BCBSM's
favor. The court reasoned that there was no price fixing because the price non-
discrimination clause did not dictate providers' fees. The court held that the
clause "provides only that the provider cannot charge Blue Cross more for serv-
ices rendered to its members than the provider charges non-members for similar
services." 52 In the court's view, simply requiring that BCBSM be given the ben-
efit of the lowest rate charged by the provider would not affect the providers'
charges to others and, therefore, was not per se illegal price fixing.5 3
In the parallel action brought under Michigan's antitrust law, the Michigan
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's finding of price fixing. The appeals
court labeled the price nondiscrimination clause as "only good business sense,"
and summarily concluded that there was no price fixing because the providers
were "free to charge the public whatever they want, and BCBSM has no control
over that."' 54 Like the federal court, the state court ignored the possibility that
the MFN clause would affect the providers' decision regarding the fees charged
to non-BCBSM patients.
2. Madden v. California Dental Service 55
The California Dental Service (CDS) is a dental service benefit plan estab-
lished by California dentists. In return for a periodic premium, a subscriber can
obtain specified services from a dentist5 6 Although the subscriber can obtain
services from any dentist, there are incentives to obtain services from a dentist
that participates in the plan.57 Over ninety percent of California's dentists
49. Michigan Ass'n of Psychotherapy Clinics v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Mich., 118
Mich. App. 505, 508-10, 325 N.W.2d 471, 473-75 (1982). The price nondiscrimination clause stated:
"Provider agrees to bill BCBSM for Covered Services at not more than the same level of charges
which the Provider has in effect for patients who are not entitled to Covered Services but who receive
services similar in character to Covered Services." Id. at 520, 325 N.W.2d at 482.
50. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Mich. v. Michigan Ass'n of Psychotherapy Clinics, 1980-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,351 (E.D. Mich. 1980). Section 1 of the Sherman Act states: "Every con-
tract, combination. .. , or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce.. ., is declared to be illegal."
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
51. Michigan Ass'n of Psychotherapy Clinics v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Mich., 118
Mich. App. 505, 325 N.W.2d 471 (1982). Michigan antitrust laws are patterned after federal anti-
trust laws. Id. at 510, 325 N.W.2d at 475.
52. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Mich. v. Michigan Ass'n of Psychotherapy Clinics, 1980-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,351, at 75,794 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
53. Id.
54. Michigan Ass'n of Psychotherapy Clinics, 118 Mich. App. at 520, 325 N.W.2d at 482.
55. 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCII) 67,176 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1986).
56. Id. at 63,043.
57. If services are obtained from a nonparticipating dentist, the patient must pay for the serv-
ices and then obtain reimbursement from CDS, and the reimbursement cannot exceed the amount
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participate.58
Under the plan, participating dentists agree not to charge CDS subscribers
more than the dentists' "usual" fees. The usual-fee provision, which defines
"usual fee" as the lowest fee that the dentist regularly charges for a particular
service, is, in effect, an MFN clause.59
Plaintiffs were CDS subscribers. They claimed a violation of California's
antitrust law based, in part, on the contractual prohibition preventing participat-
ing dentists from charging fees to others that were lower than their fees to CDS
subscribers. 6° Plaintiffs' argument presumed that a dentist participating in CDS
would not be willing to lower fees to a competing preferred provider organiza-
tion (PPO) because the dentist would be required contractually to also lower fees
to CDS.
The court ultimately granted CDS's motion for summary judgment because
of plaintiffs' lack of evidence establishing how they, as CDS subscribers, would
be injured by the MFN clause. The MFN clause required that any lower price
to others also be given to plaintiffs. Therefore, the clause benefitted plaintiffs,
unless they could show that the MFN clause prevented select discounts to others
that eventually would bring down all dental fees. Although the court recog-
nized that this was theoretically possible, the plaintiffs presented no such
evidence.61
Although the suit was dismissed because CDS subscribers were not the ap-
propriate plaintiffs to challenge any anticompetitive effects of MFN clauses, the
court did discuss those possible effects. The court started with the proposition
that, in most instances, a customer has a right to demand a price as low as the
price offered by the dentist to any other customer.62 The court claimed that
such MFN agreements do not require the dentist to raise prices, but simply to
charge the same prices to all. The court then stated that "[e]ven if the practice
reduces discounting, and thus discourages price competition, this is an accepta-
ble consequence of arms' length agreements negotiated between independent
buyers and sellers for their respective advantages." 63 The court did not explain
why reduced price competition was acceptable. It simply cited precedent" and
charged by 50% of all dentists for that procedure. By comparison, if services are obtained from a
participating dentist, payment is made by CDS directly to the dentist, and the payment cannot
exceed the amount charged by 90% of all dentists for that procedure. Id. at 63,043, 63,046.
58. Id. at 63,043.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 63,046. Plaintiffs' attack on MFN clauses was not central to their complaint. Their
principal concern was a CDS rule prohibiting dentists from waiving collection of the patients' copay-
ment. Id. at 63,049-52.
61. Id. at 63,053.
62. Id. at 63,052.
63. Id. (citations omitted).
64. In addition to F.L Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984), and
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan v. Michigan Association of Psychotherapy Clinics, 1980-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 63,351 (E.D. Mich. 1980), the court cited Pennsylvania Dental Association v.
Medical Service Association of Pennsylvania, 745 F.2d 248 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1016
(1985). In Pennsylvania DentalAssociation, the contract between Blue Shield (Medical Service Asso-
ciation) and participating dentists limited the dentists to charging Blue Shield their "usual fees,"
The dentists challenged, inter alia, Blue Shield's practice of conducting reviews of the dentists' bill-
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moved on to consider whether CDS should be treated like a typical buyer of
dental services.
California Dental Services was controlled by its participating dentists,
which included over ninety percent of California's dentists. Therefore, the court
viewed the MFN clauses, which were ostensibly between CDS and the dentists,
as horizontal agreements among the dentists not to lower prices, as opposed to
simple arms-length agreements between independent buyers and sellers. In this
context, the court stated that it would be necessary to determine whether the
MFN clauses unreasonably restrained competition by weighing their benefits-
minimizing CDS's costs and lowering its subscriber's premiums-against their
competitive disadvantages-discouraging dentists from cutting fees to compete
for new patients.65 The Madden court avoided the weighing process, however,
by holding that plaintiffs, CDS subscribers, had not established that they suf-
fered any injury because of the alleged restraint on competition.66
3. Kitsap Physicians Service v. Washington Dental Service67
Washington Dental Service (WDS) offered prepaid dental service through-
out the State of Washington. Kitsap offered the same service in a three-county
area. Dentists initially charged less to Kitsap subscribers than to WDS subscrib-
ers. However, the contract between WDS and its participating dentists included
an MFN clause, called a nondiscrimination clause in this instance, that prohib-
ited the dentists from charging WDS subscribers more than they charged any
other patients. Under the nondiscrimination clause, WDS lowered its payments
to participating dentists who were also participants in Kitsap. Many of those
dentists had more patients who were WDS subscribers than Kitsap subscribers;
therefore, to avoid lowering their fees to WSD subscribers, twenty-six of sixty
participating dentists left Kitsap.68 Kitsap sued under section 2 of the Sherman
Act,69 alleging that WDS attempted to monopolize the prepaid dental insurance
market. In denying Kitsap's motion for a preliminary injunction, the court held
that the MFN clause "makes good business sense."'70 It is "pro-competitive" 71
because it "provides insurance companies with protection from (1) being
overcharged by dentists, and (2) in the long term, being priced out of the highly
competitive dental insurance market."'72
ing records to ensure that the dentists were charging Blue Shield their usual fee. The court rejected
the dentists' challenge because, although the dentists were ethically bound not to inflate their bills,
many in fact did inflate their bills, and the reviews were approved by the state health department.
Id. at 258-59.
65. 1986-1 Trade Cas. at 63,053.
66. See supra text accompanying note 61.
67. 671 F. Supp. 1267 (W.D. Wash. 1987).
68. Id. at 1268.
69. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
70. Kitsap Physicians Serv., 671 F. Supp. at 1269.
71. Id. at 1270.
72. Id. at 1269.
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4. Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Ina v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of
Rhode Island73
Prior to 1984, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Rhode Island (BCBSRI) was
essentially the only provider of health care financing in Rhode Island.74 Ocean
State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. (Ocean State), an HMO organized in 1984,
was eighty-percent owned by Rhode Island physicians. 75 From its inception,
Ocean State offered better coverage for a lower premium than BCBSRI. By
1986, Ocean State's enrollment of 70,000 exceeded all expectations; in contrast,
BCBSRI had lost 30,000 of its 543,000 subscribers. 76
BCBSRI responded to its competitive and financial difficulties by establish-
ing its own HMO,77 revising its pricing policies to make its traditional coverage
more expensive for employers that offered Ocean State's HMO to their employ-
ees,78 and adopting a policy called the "Prudent Buyer" policy. The Prudent
Buyer policy called for the inclusion of an MFN clause in contracts with provid-
ers. Under the MFN clause, if a physician lowered her fees for services rendered
to an Ocean State subscriber, the physician was required to accept the same fees
for services rendered to a BCBSRI subscriber.79
Ocean State's contracts with the physicians required Ocean State to with-
73. 883 F.2d 1101 (1st Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1473 (1990).
74. The district court commented that "[not only did Blue Cross and Blue Shield have a better
'mousetrap,' it had the only 'mousetrap' in town." Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue
Cross and Blue Shield of R.I., 692 F. Supp. 52, 68 (D.R.I. 1988), aff'd, 883 F.2d 1101 (1st Cir.
1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1473 (1990).
75. Ocean State, 883 F.2d at 1103.
76. Id.
77. BCBSRI's HMO, called HealthMate, was modeled after Ocean State and was marketed to
employers who offered Ocean State to their employees. Id. Ocean State argued that the develop-
ment of HealthMate was part of BCBSRI's willful actions to maintain its monopoly power. Id. at
1104. The First Circuit ruled that the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1012(b), 1013(b)
(1988), which under certain circumstances exempts the business of insurance from antitrust scrutiny,
applied to HealthMate. Ocean State, 883 F.2d at 1107.
78. BCBSRI's new pricing policy was labeled "adverse selection." Ocean State, 883 F.2d at
1103. BCBSRI asserted that if an employer offered an HMO, the healthier employees would choose
the HMO leaving relatively more unhealthy employees in BCBSRI's traditional plan. Therefore,
BCBSRI's costs would be higher for its traditional plan when employers offered an HMO. BCBSRI
thus adopted the following pricing policy for its traditional plan: The rate would be lowest if only its
traditional plan were offered; the rate would be at an intermediate level if the employer also offered a
competing HMO (eg., Ocean State) and HealthMate (BCBSRI's HMO); and the rate would be
highest if the employer offered a competing HMO but did not offer HealthMate. Id. No explanation
is given as to why BCBSRI's costs for its traditional plan would be lower when an employer offered
two HMOs than when it offered only one HMO (Ocean State). Regardless, the First Circuit held
that the adverse selection pricing policy was not subject to antitrust scrutiny because it was part of
the "business of insurance" that satisfied the standards of the McCarran-Ferguson Act's exception
from the antitrust laws. Id. at 1107.
Assuming that the court's holding that the adverse selection pricing policy and HealthMate, see
supra note 77, are exempt under McCarran-Ferguson is correct, it does not follow that these activi-
ties are irrelevant to an analysis of nonexempt actions taken by BCBSRI. For example, if the pur-
pose of the adverse selection pricing policy were to exclude Ocean State from the market, it would be
a reasonable inference that other, nonexempt, policies adopted at the same time and under the same
circumstances, such as the Prudent Buyer pricing policy, see infra text accompanying note 79, had
the same purpose. The court did not address this possibility and ignored HealthMate and adverse
selection when considering the competitive implications of the Prudent Buyer policy.
79. Ocean State, 883 F.2d at 1103-04.
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hold twenty percent of the physicians' fees.80 To the extent that the HMO was
profitable, it would give the withheld fees to the physicians at the end of the
year. If costs were greater than the subscribers' premiums, the twenty percent
would be retained by Ocean State. This policy, not uncommon among HMOs,
was designed to encourage physicians to be judicial in deciding what services to
provide to a patient.
In 1985 and 1986, Ocean State operated at a loss and retained twenty per-
cent of the physicians' fees. 8' Thus, the physicians in effect sold their services to
Ocean State at a twenty percent lower fee than the services they sold to BCB-
SRI. BCBSRI then instituted its Prudent Buyer policy. The physicians thus
were faced with the choice of either accepting a twenty-percent cut in fees paid
by BCBSRI or abandoning Ocean State. About 350 of Ocean State's 1200 physi-
cians chose to resign.82
Ocean State and a class of its participating physicians brought an action
against BCBSRI claiming, inter alia, that BCBSRI was violating section 2 of the
Sherman Act by monopolizing the health care insurance industry in Rhode Is-
land.83 The First Circuit listed the elements of a monopolization case as:
(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2)
the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished
from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product,
business acumen, or historic accident.84
The parties did not dispute that BCBSRI had .monopoly power and that its
monopoly power was acquired legitimately.85 The sole antitrust issue before the
court was whether BCBSRI had maintained its monopoly power willfully.8 6
80. Id. at 1104.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it a felony to "monopolize ... any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States." 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). The jury found a violation of § 2,
although it awarded no damages on that count. Ocean State, 883 F.2d at 1105. Ocean State also
alleged a pendent state law claim of tortious interference with the contractual relations between
Ocean State and physicians. The tortious interference claim was based on the same acts as the § 2
claim. Id. at 1104-05. The jury found a violation and awarded approximately $3,000,000 in com-
pensatory and punitive damages under the tortious interference claim. Id. at 1105. The district
court then granted BCBSRI's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on both the § 2
and the tortious interference claims. Id. (citing Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue
Cross and Blue Shield of R.I., 692 F. Supp. 52 (D.R.I. 1988)). Regarding the § 2 count, the district
court ruled that because the jury awarded no damages, Ocean State failed to prove injury caused by
an antitrust violation and thus failed to establish a § 2 case. Id. at 1106. The First Circuit decided
to avoid this issue and instead affirmed the judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the alternative
ground that BCBSRI did not willfully maintain its monopoly power by adopting the Prudent Buyer
policy. Id. at 1105-07, 1109-13. Because the Prudent Buyer policy was also the basis for the tortious
interference claim, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict on that count as well. Id. at 1113-14.
Ocean State had also alleged a violation of § I of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982), based
on a 1982 agreement between Blue Cross and Blue Shield to merge and an agreement between BCB-
SRI and another entity regarding hospital discounts. Id. at 1104 n.3. The district court's directed
verdict for BCBSRI on the § 1 count was not appealed. Id.
84. Ocean State, 883 F.2d at 1110 (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-
71 (1966)).
85. Id.
86. Id.
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Specifically, the issue was whether adoption of the Prudent Buyer policy im-
properly excluded competition (Le., Ocean State) from the market and thereby
allowed BCBSRI to maintain its monopoly power. In concluding that adopting
the Prudent Buyer policy, as a matter of law, did not violate section 2 of the
Sherman Act, the First Circuit stated that
a policy of insisting on a supplier's lowest price-assuming that the
price is not "predatory" or below the supplier's incremental cost-
tends to further competition on the merits and, as a matter of law, is
not exclusionary. It is hard to disagree with the district court's view:
As a naked proposition, it would seem silly to argue that a
policy to pay the same amount for the same service is an-
ticompetitive, even on the part of one who has market power.
This, it would seem, is what competition should be all
about.8 7
5. Reazin v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas, Inc. 88
Unlike each of the preceding cases, Reazin did not involve a challenge to
the legality of MFN clauses under the antitrust laws. However, the court did
have the opportunity to analyze the competitive impact of MFN clauses em-
ployed by Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas (BCBSK) in the context of
evaluating BCBSK's market power. To put the analysis of MFN clauses in con-
text, it is necessary to consider first the facts and legal theory in Reazin.
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas was by far the largest health care
insurer in Kansas. In the mid-1980s, it controlled between fifty and sixty per-
cent of the market. No other company controlled more than five percent of the
market.8 9
Through several acquisitions, Hospital Corporation of America (HCA) be-
came a competitor of BCBSK. In 1985, HCA, which owns or manages more
for-profit hospitals throughout the United States than any other company,
purchased Wesley Medical Center, the largest hospital in Wichita. HCA also
purchased an HMO and a health insurance company operating in Kansas.90
Within a few months of these acquisitions, BCBSK announced that it would
terminate its provider contract with Wesley hospital. 9 1 Wesley filed suit, claim-
ing, inter alia, that BCBSK's termination of the provider contract would violate
87. Id. (quoting Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of R.I.,
692 F. Supp. 52, 71 (D.R.I. 1988), aff'd, 883 F.2d 1101 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1473 (1990)),
88. 899 F.2d 951 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 3241 (1990).
89. Id. at 969 & n.26.
90. Id. at 957.
91. Id. at 957-58. One of the oddities complicating the Reazin case was that BCBSK never
actually terminated Wesley hospital. After the suit was filed, the parties agreed to maintain the
status quo pending its resolution. Id. at 957-58 n.7. A year later, HCA sold the HMO it had
purchased and withdrew from the health care financing field in Kansas. Id. BCBSK then signed a
new provider contract with Wesley. Id. Therefore, the case was akin to a declaratory judgment
action and BCBSK argued that Wesley could not prove damages. Id. at 972 & n.34. The court
rejected BCBSK's argument, stating that:
Wesley introduced evidence at trial that, because of Blue Cross' announced termination of
Wesley as a contracting provider hospital, it (1) spent money on advertisements to reassure
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sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.92
Wesley contended that BCBSK had entered into an agreement with two
other Wichita hospitals whereby BCBSK was to terminate Wesley's status as a
participating hospital in consideration for the two other hospitals significantly
lowering their prices to BCBSK.93 The alleged anticompetitive effect of the
agreement was to reduce the competitive significance of Wesley-HCA and to
allow BCBSK to maintain its dominant position.94 In addition to the direct
effect on Wesley-HCA, Wesley's threatened termination allegedly sent a message
to other hospitals that might have considered entering into agreements with
HMO-insurers offering alternative delivery systems in competition with
BCBSK. Unfortunately for BCBSK, a letter from BCBSK's president to all
Kansas hospitals made that message explicit by threatening to terminate any
hospital that joined an IMO in competition with BCBSK.95 A number of Kan-
sas hospital administrators testified that in response to the threatened termina-
tion of Wesley's participating status and this letter, they chose not to enter into
alliances that would compete with BCBSK.96
In defending its actions, BCBSK argued that to prove a violation of section
1 of the Sherman Act, plaintiffs had to establish that it had market power.97 In
the Tenth Circuit, "market power,' is defined as "either 'power to control price'
or 'power to exclude competition.' "9 Without deciding whether a showing of
market power was necessary under the facts of this case,99 the Tenth Circuit
examined plaintiff's evidence of BCBSK's market power. That evidence in-
cluded the competitive effects of MFN clauses in the contracts between BCBSK
and all of the hospitals in Kansas.
In 1984, BCBSK revised its contracts with all of the hospitals in Kansas,
adding MFN clauses.b10 The district court found that at least one of the reasons
patients that Blue Cross subscribers were still welcome at Wesley, (2) reduced its prices in
order to retain its market share, and (3) lost patients.
Id. at 962 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 955.
93. Id. at 960.
94. Id. at 964.
95. The letter stated:
We cannot stand idly by and watch insurance-hospital corporations, such as HCA, monop-
olize the delivery and financing of care by seeking to enroll Blue Cross and Blue Shield
subscribers in their insurance programs. Vertical integration is a strategy some hospitals
may feel to be in their best interest. However, if hospitals decide to compete with Blue
Cross and Blue Shield in the manner that HCA is competing, Blue Cross and Blue Shield
must make a business decision about its future relationship with these entities. Hospitals
that wish to continue their current relationship with Blue Cross and Blue Shield, that do
not seek to enroll subscribers in other programs, and that wish to cooperate with Blue
Cross and Blue Shield as a major marketing arm of the hospital, will experience no change
in the contractual relationship that has historically served Kansans well.
Id. at 958 n.8.
96. Id. at 966 & n.21.
97. Id. at 966.
98. Id. (quoting Westman Comm'n Co. v. Hobart Int'l, Inc., 796 F.2d 1216, 1225 n.3 (10th Cir.
1986), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1005 (1988)).
99. Id. at 968 n.24.
100. Id. at 957 n.7.
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BCBSK adopted MFN clauses was "to forestall other insurance companies from
receiving any better prices from a hospital, which would enable competitors to
offer lower rates to subscribers for medical insurance." 10 1 The Tenth Circuit
affirmed the district court's holding, concluding that there was "considerable
testimony on the effect of Blue Cross' most favored nations clause, and the jury
could reasonably have concluded that that clause contributed to Blue Cross'
power over price."10 2 In drawing this conclusion, the Tenth Circuit noted the
First Circuit's opinion in Ocean State about the antitrust consequences of MFN
clauses:
The fact that the First Circuit has recently concluded that, as a matter
of law, a "Prudent Buyer" policy utilized by Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of Rhode Island, essentially identical to the most favored na-
tions clause in this case, did not constitute monopolization in violation
of section 2 does not alter our conclusion on the existence of Blue
Cross' monopoly power here. In Ocean State, Blue Cross conceded its
monopoly power. The only question was whether Blue Cross violated
section 2. By contrast, the most favored nations clause here is not
itself challenged as unlawful monopolization. Rather, it is only consid-
ered as evidence of, or as contributing to, Blue Cross' market or mo-
nopoly power. We need not reach the question addressed in Ocean
State of whether use of the most favored nations clause could itself
violate section 2.103
Thus, the Tenth Circuit took the position that MFN clauses can contribute
to market or monopoly power-the power to control price or exclude competi-
tion. Although MFN clauses have this anticompetitive potential, the Tenth Cir-
cuit was correct in asserting that its position was not necessarily inconsistent
with the First Circuit's conclusion in Ocean State that MFN clauses are "not
exclusionary." The First Circuit stated that, for purposes of section 2 of the
Sherman Act, "exclusionary conduct" is "'behavior that not only (1) tends to
impair the opportunities of rivals, but also (2) either does not further competi-
tion on the merits or does so in an unnecessarily restrictive way.' "104 The First
Circuit held that MFN clauses "tended to further competition on the merits"' 10 5
101. Reazin v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 1360, 1376 (D. Kan.
1987), aff'd, 899 F.2d 951 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 3241 (1990).
102. Reazin, 899 F.2d at 971. The district court had capsulized the testimony as showing that
the MFN clauses could have
effectively prevented discounting to other insurers, and since the price of hospital care is
the single largest element of health care financing companies' costs, the "most favored
nations" clause effectively prevents competing insurance companies from offering more
favorable insurance rates to consumers. This clause gives defendant the ability to prevent
insurance prices from falling, thus providing it the ability to effectively control insurance
prices.
Reazin v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kan., Inc,, 663 F. Supp. 1360, 1418 (D. Kan. 1987) (citation
to record omitted), aff'd, 899 F.2d 951 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 3241 (1990).
103. Reazin, 899 F.2d at 971 n.30 (citations omitted).
104. Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of R.I., 883 F.2d
1101, 1110 (1st Cir. 1989) (quoting 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTrrRusT LAW I 626b, at 78
(1978), quoted in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 n.32 (1985)),
105. Id.
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and, therefore, could not be exclusionary under section 2.106 For the Tenth
Circuit's purpose of determining whether BCBSK had market power in connec-
tion with a section 1 allegation, it was sufficient that MFN clauses could exclude
rivals, thus contributing to BCBSK's market power. 10 7 Therefore, the Tenth
Circuit feasibly could hold that MFN clauses exclude rivals and lead to market
power without reaching "the question addressed in Ocean State of whether use
of the most favored nations clause could itself violate section 2.' 'l8
Although the Tenth Circuit neatly avoided explicit conflict with the First
Circuit, implicit conflict was unavoidable. Throughout the district court's and
the Tenth Circuit's opinions, MFN clauses were characterized in anticompeti-
tive tones. At no point did the opinions indicate that MFN clauses are procom-
petitive or, as stated in Ocean State, "'what competition should be all
about.' 109 Moreover, if MFN clauses were simply a legitimate, procompetitive
strategy, like charging a price equal to marginal cost, or efficiently managing a
company, it seems unlikely that the court would have concluded that they gave
BCBSK the power to raise prices and thereby supported a finding of a section 1
violation. Nevertheless, the key question for antitrust purposes remains: Are
MFN clauses anticompetitive or procompetitive?
IV. COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS OF MOST FAVORED NATIONS CLAUSES
The preceding health care cases posit two potentially anticompetitive effects
of MFN clauses: (1) the reduction or elimination of discounting by providers
because they would have to give the discount to all customers; 110 and (2) the
inhibition of entry of alternative delivery systems, such as HMOs and PPOs,
106. The First Circuit ignored the second half of its own test: whether MFN clauses further
competition on the merits in an unreasonably restrictive way.
107. Concerning the § 2 allegation in Reazin, the Tenth Circuit found consideration of the ef-
fects of MFN clauses unnecessary because BCBSK engaged in other actions that the Tenth Circuit
considered illegitimate and anticompetitive: "threatening to terminate Wesley's contracting pro-
vider agreement and reducing the maximum allowable payments for the remaining [Wichita] hospi-
tals, thereby coercing other hospitals into not doing business with Blue Cross competitors." Reazin,
899 F.2d at 973.
108. Id. at 971 n.30. See generally Baker, supra note 8 (analyzing, prior to the courts of appeals'
opinions, possibility that actions of BCBSRI and BCBSK could raise rivals' costs and thus be
anticompetitive).
109. Ocean State, 883 F.2d at 1110 (quoting Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue
Cross and Blue Shield of R.I., 692 F. Supp. 52, 71 (D.R.I. 1988), aff'd, 883 F.2d 1101 (1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1473 (1990)).
110. An early case that involved the health care industry but was unrelated to the line of cases
discussed in the text nicely illustrates the effect of MFN clauses on discounting. See United States v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 1959 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,536 (D.N.J. 1959). In Lilly, five manufacturers were
charged with horizontal price fixing in the sale of polio vaccine to public agencies. The court held
that the government failed to prove a conspiracy among the manufacturers to fix prices. Instead, the
court found that the uniform prices were the result of MFN clauses included in contracts between
the government and the manufacturers. The MFN clauses would have required any discount that
was given to the federal government also be given to state governments. This led to each manufac-
turer unilaterally deciding not to give any discounts. Moreover, the court noted that foreign govern-
ments received lower and varying prices because the MFN clauses did not apply to such sales. This
fact bolstered the court's conclusion that the absence of discounting in the United States was because
of the MFN clauses, not collusion among manufacturers. Once the MFN clauses expired, selective
discounts appeared in domestic bids. Id. at 76,152-53.
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because they would not be able to entice providers to give them a discount. In
addition, the FTC's analysis in Ethyl I"1 indicates that MFN clauses, in the con-
text of an oligopolistic industry, can facilitate tacit collusion by reducing uncer-
tainty regarding pricing. The cases also present two potentially procompetitive
effects of MFN clauses: (1) lower prices overall because discounts will be given
to all buyers; and (2) a guarantee to buyers that they all are receiving the same
price.
With the exceptions of the FTC's opinion in Ethyl and the Tenth Circuit's
opinion in Reazin,112 the preceding cases concluded that the procompetitive ef-
fects of MFN clauses prevail over the anticompetitive effects. None of those
cases, however, provides an analytical framework for judging the economic ef-
fects of MFN clauses. This part of the Article provides such a framework. A
close analogy exists between the Robinson-Patman Act and MFN clauses-both
prohibit selective discounting or price discrimination. 113 Therefore, it is possible
to gain an understanding of the competitive effects of MFN clauses by applying
what has been learned from studying the Robinson-Patman Act's prohibition of
price discrimination. First, however, it is useful to consider why a provider
would discriminate in price against BCBS subscribers if not prevented from do-
ing so by an MFN clause.
A. The Basis for Provider Discrimination Against BCBS
Providers working at full capacity serving BCBS subscribers (or other pa-
tients who pay full price) have nothing to gain by lowering their price and, there-
fore, would not price discriminate. If, however, the provider has excess
capacity, it can increase its profits by serving additional patients at a lower price
so long as that price exceeds its marginal opportunity cost, The situation is
analogous to any supplier deciding whether to engage in price discrimination.
Assuming it is practical, price discrimination always will increase a supplier's
profit unless the supplier can sell all its capacity at the relatively high price.' 1 4
111. In re Ethyl Corp., 101 F.T.C, 425, 628-32 (1983), rev'd sub nom. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours
& Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984).
112. Reazin v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 899 F.2d 951 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 3241 (1990).
113. The Robinson-Patman Act makes it unlawful, under certain circumstances
to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities... where the effect of
such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monop-
oly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person
who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with custom-
ers of either of them ....
15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988). On its face, the Robinson-Patman Act does not apply to the sale ofmedi-
cal services because medical services are not "commodities." See Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mu-
tual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1340 (7th Cir. 1986).
The term "price discrimination" as used in the Robinson-Patman Act simply means a price
difference. See Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 110 S. Ct. 2535, 2544 (1990). In economics, however, the
term "price discrimination" means selling a product to different customers either at different price-
to-marginal-cost ratios or at different per-unit profits. See Celnicker & Seaman, Functional Dis-
counts Trade Discounts, Economic Price Discrimination and the Robinson-Patman Act, 1989 UTAH
L. REv. $13, 816-17. This Article uses the term price discrimination in its legal sense and assumes,
unless stated otherwise, that the price differences referred to are also economic price discriminations.
114. See L. PHLIPS, supra note 30, at 7.
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There are four conditions that must be satisfied before a provider can price
discriminate: (1) the provider must have some market power; (2) the buyers
must have differing elasticities of demand; (3) the provider must be able to segre-
gate the buyers based on their differing elasticities of demand; and (4) profitable
arbitrage must not be possible.115 In the context of providers selling to BCBS
and HMO or PPO enrollees, all four conditions are satisfied.
The first condition necessary for price discrimination is that the provider
must have some market power, though it need not be significant market power.
In the context of price discrimination, market power simply means that the pro-
vider faces a downward sloping-rather than horizontal-demand curve. 116 If
the patient is considered the buyer (ignoring the effect of insurance), then it is
well-established that few providers face a horizontal demand curve. A five per-
cent rise in price would not lead to a loss of all patients. 117 The presence of
insurance, however, complicates the market power issue.
Market power is a prerequisite to price discrimination because, without it, if
a provider attempted to charge a relatively high price to certain customers, rival
providers would compete for that profitable business. Therefore, competition
would bid the price back down to the competitive level. When the patient's
insurance plan effectively controls which providers its subscribers frequent, the
provider's market power might be curtailed. If the plan serves as an informed
agent of its subscribers and limits the subscribers' choice to a relatively small
portion of providers chosen by the plan based on price, providers may lose much
of their market power. This process, however, does not apply to providers sell-
ing to a traditional BCBS plan.
Under the traditional BCBS plan, BCBS aims to contract with practically
all providers in the market. This policy dates back to the origins of BCBS. In
the 1930s, Blue Cross plans were developed under the auspices of the American
Hospital Association (AHA) as a mechanism for hospitals to obtain prepayment
for their services. 18 The "Essentials of an Acceptable Plan for Group Hospital-
ization" adopted by the AHA included the notions that "[t]he subscriber should
have free choice of hospital" and "[a]ll recognized hospitals in the community
should participate."'1 19 Similarly, state and county medical societies established
115. See A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION: THEORY IN USE 136-37
(1969); E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 286 (2d ed. 1975); L.
PHLIPS, supra note 30, at 16. See generally W. BAUMOL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND OPERATIONS
ANALYSIS 347-48 (3d ed. 1972) (discussing discriminating monopoly). "Profitable arbitrage" occurs
when a buyer purchases a commodity at a low price and then profitably resells the commodity at a
higher price.
116. See M. ADELMAN, A & P: A STUDY IN PRicE-CoSr BEHAVIOR AND PUBLIC POLICY 220
(1959); L. PHLiPS, supra note 30, at 16.
117. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 27-28 (1984); Frech, supra note
36, at 361-62. In a perfectly competitive market where providers have no market power, MFN
clauses would be redundant. All identical transactions would occur at the same price because no
buyer need pay more than the competitive prices (which equals marginal cost) and no provider could
sell for less than the competitive price and earn a normal return. Therefore, the use of MFN clauses
itself indicates that we are not dealing in a perfectly competitive market.
118. See H. SOMERS & A. SOMERS, DOCTORS, PATIENTS, AND HEALTH INsuRANcE 292, 295
(1961); The Blue Cross and Blue Shield Fact Book 1979 2; Havighurst, supra note 37, at 248-49.
119. H. SOMERS & A. SOMERS, supra note 118, at 292; see also L. REED, BLUE CROSS AND
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Blue Shield plans during the Depression to help doctors collect their fees.120
The American Medical Association's "Seal of Acceptance" for Blue Shield plans
included the requirement that "[tlhere should be no regulation which restricts
free choice of a qualified doctor of medicine in the locality covered by the plan
who is willing to give services under the conditions established."''17 In fact,
many of the statutes establishing Blue Shield plans require that all licensed phy-
sicians in the area be allowed to participate.122
The principles underlying BCBS include the subscriber's freedom to choose
any doctor or hospital in the community and the concomitant right of all doc-
tors and hospitals to participate in the plans. Data collected by the FTC in 1978
regarding sixty-five Blue Shield plans showed that for twenty-nine of the plans,
over ninety percent of the community's doctors participated, and for fifty-two of
the plans, over seventy percent of the community's doctors participated. 123
Moreover, in areas where it has a large subscriber base, BCBS could not signifi-
cantly limit the number of participating providers and still provide good service
to its customers.' 24 With essentially all providers in a market who wish to par-
ticipate in a BCBS plan doing so, a high price to BCBS will not lead to other
providers competing for that profitable business; they all can have access to the
profitable BCBS business. Therefore, providers have market power when deal-
ing with BCBS.
The second condition necessary for price discrimination is that buyers must
have different elasticities of demand. As discussed above, BCBS plans generally
are open to all providers and indeed have contracted with a large propdrtion of
the providers in their markets to service their subscribers. Conversely, a rela-
tively small HMO or PPO can adequately serve its subscribers with relatively
few providers. Therefore, the HMO or PPO can select only those providers that
have excess capacity and are willing to discount their fees to obtain additional
patients. BCBS does not have that ability. 125 Therefore, BCBS has a less elastic
MEDICAL SERVICE PLANS 47 (1947) ("[Ithe great majority of plans have contracts with all the
eligible general hospitals of their area."); Frech, supra note 36, at 357 (Shortly after Blue Cross plans
were formed in the early 1930s, "the Blue Cross plans began to contract with all or most area
hospitals.").
120. See H. SOMERS & A. SOMERS, supra note 118, at 317-19; The Blue Cross and Blue Shield
Fact Book 1979 2; Havighurst, supra note 37, at 249.
121. H. SOMERS & A. SOMERS, supra note 118, at 319.
122. R. EILEPS, REGULATION OF BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD PLANS 134 (1963).
123. Bureau of Competition, FTC, Medical Participation in Control of Blue Shield and Certain
Other Open-Panel Medical Prepayment Plans B-3 to B-11 (1979); see also L. REED, supra note 119,
at 170-72 (indicating substantial participation in most plans and discussing reasons for some doctors'
choosing not to participate).
124. A study based on BCBS of Michigan noted: "It is entirely possible that, in the absence of
enough participating physicians, the Insurance Commissioner could revoke Blue Shield's right to sell
service contracts, the only type it is authorized to sell, on the grounds of fraud." 2 W. McNERNEY,
HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL ECONOMICS 1362 (1962).
125. This difference between the traditional BCBS plan and alternative delivery systems allows
the alternatives to be more efficient. See Frech, supra note 36, at 359-64. A small number of states
have enacted statutes or regulations requiring PPOs to contract with "any willing provider" meeting
predetermined criteria. Any-willing-provider provisions threaten the ability of the PPO to exclude
providers who practice in a costly manner or who do not provide quality care. The provisions may
also limit the bargaining power of the PPO in negotiating discounts in exchange for a certain volume
of business from PPO subscribers. See Rolph, Ginsburg & Hosek, supra note 42, at 38-39.
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demand for provider services.
The third condition for price discrimination is that the provider must be
able to differentiate between buyers with relatively elastic demand curves and
buyers with relatively inelastic demand curves. Buyers with relatively elastic
demand curves are sensitive to price and, in response to a price change, will
change their buying decisions to a greater degree than buyers with relatively
inelastic demand curves. Therefore, the discriminating seller needs to be able to
differentiate among buyers based on their demand elasticity. This problem is
often significant for a vendor selling to huge numbers of anonymous consum-
ers.126 A provider dealing with a handful of third-party payers in a local mar-
ket, however, easily should be able to differentiate between a price-sensitive
HMO or PPO that will eschew high-priced providers and a BCBS plan that will
contract with practically all providers in the market.
The final condition necessary for price discrimination is that profitable arbi-
trage must not be possible. Price discrimination cannot persist if those who pay
less can profitably resell to those who pay more. Arbitrage is not possible, how-
ever, when dealing with services such as health care. 127 A patient who pays a
provider a low fee for an appendectomy, nevertheless, will be unable to resell
that appendectomy to another patient who is being charged a high fee by the
provider.
Providers with excess capacity have both the financial motivation and the
ability to price discriminate against BCBS. 128 Because such price discrimina-
tion would put BCBS at a competitive disadvantage, BCBS can be expected to
try to prevent the price discrimination. Thus, the MFN clause becomes BCBS's
weapon to prevent being victimized by price discrimination. The question then
becomes: Is the prevention of price discrimination procompetitive or
anticompetitive?
B. The Competitive Effects of Prohibiting Price Discrimination
In considering the effects of the Robinson-Patman Act,12 9 which prohibits
price discrimination in certain circumstances, antitrust analysts have dealt at
length with the competitive effects of prohibiting price discrimination. That
work, reviewed next, establishes that the legal prohibition of price discrimina-
126. When dealing with large numbers of anonymous consumers, sellers have devised various
indirect ways to gauge each one's elasticity of demand. For example, airlines try to differentiate
business travelers, who have a relatively inelastic demand, from vacationers, who have a more elastic
demand, by requiring advanced reservations and a Saturday stayover. Another example is consumer
products companies that try to differentiate customers who have relatively elastic demand by lower-
ing price to those customers who will search out discount coupons.
127. See W. BAUMOI, supra note 115, at 347.
128. The foregoing analysis assumes that the lower price charged to the HMO is a price discrim-
ination in the economic sense of that term. See supra note 113. It is interesting to note that if the
HMO is a more efficient system for delivering medical service, see infra text accompanying notes
153-58, a lower price to the IMO might not be an economic price discrimination but simply a
reflection of the lower cost of selling medical services through the HMO. The MFN clause, like the
Robinson-Patman Act, prohibits price differences regardless of whether they are price discrimina-
tions in an economic sense.
129. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988).
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tion is often anticompetitive. 130 Although the Supreme Court has stated that
"[tihe determination whether to alter the scope of the Act must be made by
Congress, not this Court," 131 the Court has warned that the Act's ban on certain
price discriminations has anticompetitive potential. 132 Rather than recount all
of the economic criticisms of the Robinson-Patman Act, 133 the major criticisms
particularly germane to the issues in this Article are reviewed. Preventing price
discriminations may: (1) eliminate a dynamic mechanism by which prices are
racheted down to the competitive level; (2) reduce output; and (3) prevent the
market from rewarding more efficient distribution systems. Although these crit-
icisms also apply to MFN clauses, there are differences between the Robinson-
Patman Act and MFN clauses that make the anticompetitive potential of MFN
clauses greater. These differences are addressed in Part IVC.
1. Eliminating a Dynamic Mechanism by which Prices are Racheted Down
to the Competitive Level
A market is a dynamic process. Individual sellers regularly adjust price
and buyers provide feedback through their purchasing decisions. A restriction
on pricing flexibility strikes at the heart of the market system. Judge Easter-
brook of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has noted
that "the control of price discrimination poses substantial risks to competition,
which often works through 'discriminatory' chiseling down of prices."' 134 Lead-
ing commentators in this area have made similar observations. Morris Adelman
has stated that "under competition, [price] discriminations are always being cre-
ated and always being destroyed. To block either the creative or the destructive
part of the process is to block competition."' 135 Similarly, Frederick Rowe has
explained that:
Blanket illegality of selective price discrimination cements rigid prices
that antitrust policy aims to loosen.... [S]elective price reduction[ ] to
"divert trade" . . . is competition. Prices reduced to gain new trade
symptomize a competitive system's effective functioning. Prohibiting
selective price reductions "low enough to get the business" comes close
to outlawing price competition itself. If a seller by law must lower all
130. See, eg., R. BORK, THE ANTRITRUST PARADOX 382-401 (1978); R. POSNER, THE ROBIN-
SON-PATMAN ACT: FEDERAL REGULATION OF PRICE DIFFERENCES 49 (1976); F. ROWE, PRICE
DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 24-29 (1962).
131. Falls City Indus., Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U.S. 428, 436 (1983).
132. See Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69, 80-81 (1979); United States v. United
States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 458 (1978); Automatic Canteen Co. of Am. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61,
63 (1953).
133. See, eg., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, 1 THE ROBINSON-
PATMAN ACT: POLICY AND LAW 27-37 (1980) (summarizing the economic criticisms and marshal-
ling the sources of the criticisms); Kintner & Bauer, The Robinson-Patman Act: A Look Backwards,
A View Forward, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 571 (1986) (summarizing criticism and acclamation of the
Act).
134. Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1340 (7th Cir. 1986).
135. Adelman, Price Discrimination as Treated in the Attorney General's Report, 104 U. PA. L.
REv. 222, 224 (1955).
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his prices or none, he will hesitate long to lower any.136
Finally, the Report of the Attorney GeneraPs National Committee to Study the
Antitrust Laws concluded that "a seller constrained by law to reduce prices to
some only at the cost of reducing prices to all may well end up by reducing them
to none."
137
These authorities support the proposition that if a provider is not free to
charge a lower price to the members of an HMO or PPO without also lowering
prices to BCBS, the provider will be inhibited from lowering prices at all. The
resulting price rigidity undermines the central role prices should play in a mar-
ket and prevents movement toward a competitive equilibrium. This is the pri-
mary criticism of the Robinson-Patman Act. It is equally applicable to MFN
clauses and supports the proposition that MFN clauses are the antithesis of
competition, and will inhibit discounting and facilitate tacit collusion.
This analysis could be read to imply that providers should welcome MFN
clauses because MFN clauses diminish downward pressure on provider prices by
preventing discriminatory discounts. However, a provider with excess capacity
can increase profits at least in the short run by price discriminating, 138 which the
MFN clause prevents. Thus, some provider opposition to MFN clauses would
appear reasonable. In the long run, however, as Easterbrook, Adelman, and
Rowe have suggested, 139 if MFN clauses were abolished, the ensuing price dis-
criminations could create competitive pressures that would lower the whole pro-
vider price structure.
Alternatively, it is possible that the market for medical services could ac-
commodate discriminatory provider pricing over the long run. There is no cer-
tainty in predicting the long-run effect of allowing discriminatory pricing
because, as the leading authority on price discrimination has stated: "The con-
ditions under which a market equilibrium with price discrimination is possible
are not yet fully understood." 140 From a societal perspective, the possibility
that allowing providers to price discriminate ultimately could put downward
pressure on the price of medical services is a powerful argument against MFN
clauses. Even if the price discriminations ultimately did not cause a lowering of
medical service prices, the price discriminations still would be desirable if they
increased the output of medical services. Therefore, the Article turns to the
136. Rowe, Price Discrimination, Competition, and Confusion: Another Look at Robinson-Pat-
man, 60 YALE L.J. 929, 956 (1951).
137. Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws 335
(1955). Similarly, Nelson and Keim wrote:
To the extent to which sellers are required to maintain uniform prices to all buyers,
they are rendered unable to seek particular sales by cutting prices. If they choose to rely
upon price competition as their primary sales argument, they must cut prices simultane-
ously to all comers. Naturally, many sellers are far more reluctant to take such a broad
step than to reduce prices on individual transactions.
NELSON & KEIM, PRICE BEHAVIOR AND BusINESS POLICY 62 (1940).
138. See supra text accompanying note 114.
139. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
140. L. PHLIPS, supra note 30, at 16.
1991]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69
question of whether MFN clauses, by preventing provider price discrimination,
reduce medical service output.
2. Reducing Output
Robert Bork has argued that the effect price discrimination has on output
should be the criteria for judging the impact on consumer welfare of a ban on
price discrimination.14 1 Unfortunately, judging output effects of MFN clauses
in provider contracts is not without its problems. The issue normally would be
framed in terms of whether price discrimination between BCBS and a competing
HMO would increase the amount of medical services provided to the public. 142
The answer would appear to turn on whether the MFN clause's ban on price
discrimination would lead to providers charging the high (BCBS) price and fore-
going sales to the HMO, or, alternatively, charging the low (HMO) price to
everyone.1 43 The provider would choose the HMO price, thereby lowering its
price to BCBS, only if the increased profits from HMO patients were greater
than the reduced profits from BCBS patients.
For example, assume the provider's marginal cost to provide medical ser-
vice is a constant $55 per unit; BCBS pays $100 per unit; the HMO pays $80 per
unit; and the provider sells 1000 units per year to BCBS patients. 144 The pro-
vider's profit on sales to BCBS patients is $45,000.145 If the provider could sell
141. R. BORK, supra note 130, at 395. The preceding section focused on the possibility that
discrimination, over time, will result in enhanced comrjetition lowering prices and increasing output
in the medical service market. The focus of the instant section is that output may be increased by a
provider utilizing price discrimination as compared to a provider charging a single, profit-maximiz-
ing price. Here, the output effects are not caused by price discrimination unraveling supracompeti-
tive pricing through the dynamic market process, but by the possibility that the discriminating
provider will produce more medical service output than the provider who is prevented from discrim-
inating by an MFN clause.
142. The moral hazard caused by comprehensive health insurance, such as traditional BCBS
plans, leads to greater health care output than is optimal. See Feldstein, The Welfare Loss of Excess
Health Insurance, 81 J. POL. EcoN. 251, 252-53 (1973); supra text accompanying notes 36-38. If
there is too much health care output already, and if provider price discrimination increases output, it
may seem anomalbus to equate an increase in output with an increase in social welfare. However,
the increase in output caused by provider price discrimination manifests itself as more patients being
served through HMOs and PPOs, which, compared to traditional BCBS plans, reduce moral hazard
and socially wasteful care. If, instead, the price discrimination produced more patients served by
traditional health insurance, serious questions could be raised about equating increased output and
increased social welfare.
143. Note that the choice facing the provider is fundamentally different from the choice facing
most sellers who would price discriminate but for a legal prohibition. For most sellers, the profit-
maximizing single price would be between the high price and the low price. That is not a rational
option for health care providers because any rise above the HMO price will result in the loss of all
the HMO's business, while any price below the BCBS price will not result in more BCBS business.
Thus, the provider prohibited from discriminating is likely to choose either the HMO price or the
BCBS price.
144. In this context, the term "unit" means a standardized measure of output. Although mea-
suring provider output in the health care industry is very difficult, the economic analysis does not
differ from factories producing widgets. The presumption that the same basic economic model used
for other industries applies to the health care industry is consistent with Supreme Court analysis in
antitrust health care cases. See FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); Jefferson
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y,
457 U.S. 332 (1982).
145. (1000 X $100) - (1000 X $55) = $45,000.
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an additional 200 units per year by joining the HMO, but because of the MFN
clause would receive the $80 per unit price (or $25 per unit profit) from both
BCBS and the HMO, then its total profit would fall from $45,000 to $30,000.146
Therefore, the provider would choose not to increase its output because of the
MFN clause.
Alternatively, even with the MFN clause the provider might still choose to
join the HMO if the added profits were great enough. If the preceding example
were changed by assuming that the HMO generated an additional 900 units per
year, then the provider would join the HMO because its profit would increase
from $45,000 to $47,500.147 In this situation, the MFN clause would have no
effect on the provider's output because the provider would join the HMO re-
gardless of the presence of the MFN clause. The clause would result in a lower
price paid by BCBS to the provider. The lower price, however, is simply a rent
transfer from the provider to BCBS. Ignoring, for now, any effect on the price
of insurance, there is no direct effect on the provider's output because the pro-
vider would produce the same number of units regardless of whether or not the
provider contract contained an MEN clause. Thus, the MEN clause's prohibi-
tion of price discrimination would appear to either reduce provider output or
leave it unchanged. In no case does the MFN clause appear to increase provider
output.
Factoring the insurance market into the analysis complicates matters. To
the extent that MEN clauses deter providers from participating in the HMO,
many would-be HMO patients presumably subscribe to BCBS instead. Output
effects in the medical service market may result from differences in the insurance
premium and the product sold by BCBS and the HMO. The issue, therefore,
becomes how the MEN clause affects output in the insurance market, which, in
turn, affects output in the medical service market. If the MFN clause deters
providers from joining the HMO, then the higher premiums for BCBS insurance
may reduce output in the insurance market, thereby reducing output in the med-
ical service market. Alternatively, if providers join the HMO despite the MFN
clause and then lower prices to BCBS, lower insurance premiums may follow
and lead to increased output in the insurance market and the medical service
market. Thus, the output effects of MFN clauses will depend not only on how
providers respond to the presence of the MFN clause, but also on how the insur-
ance market responds to the providers' decisions, and how consumers' choices
would be affected by changes in the insurance market.
If providers were discouraged from joining HMOs, the likely result would
be lessened competition in the insurance market and reduced provider output.
If providers joined the HMOs despite the MFN clause, the result might be lower
provider prices to BCBS, lower insurance premiums, and increased provider
output. Alternatively, lower provider prices to BCBS caused by the MFN
clause might enhance BCBS's profits by lowering its costs without leading to
146. [(1000 X $80) - (1000 X $55)] + [(200 X $80) - (200 X $55)] = $30,000.
147. [(1000 X $80) - (1000 X $55)] + [(900 X $80) - (900 X $55)] = $47,500.
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lower insurance premiums and higher output if BCBS retains substantial market
power.
This result was observed in Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue
Cross and Blue Shield of Rhode Island.148 In Ocean State, although physicians
lowered their fees to BCBSRI because of the MFN clause, BCBSRI did not
lower its premiums.149 Therefore, the MFN clause produced a rent transfer
from those physicians to BCBSRI, but no positive output effects. The First Cir-
cuit concluded that "nothing turns on whether Blue Cross in fact lowered its
rates. The fact remains that achieving lower costs is a legitimate business justifi-
cation under the antitrust laws."150 The notion that output effects and con-
sumer welfare are irrelevant to an antitrust analysis is not only extreme, but also
inconsistent with the court's subsequent argument that one of the reasons for not
interfering with BCBSRI's provider contracts was that MFN clauses benefit
consumers by lowering prices. 151 Regardless, Ocean State illustrates that even
where the MFN clause leads to some providers lowering their prices to BCBS,
there will not necessarily be a positive output effect. To the extent that the
MFN clause caused physicians to abandon the HMO,152 it had a negative out-
put effect and reduced the competitive significance of a more efficient distribu-
tion system. The latter effect is the focus of the third criticism of the Robinson-
Patman Act's ban on price discrimination.
3. Preventing the Market from Rewarding More Efficient
Distribution Systems
The third major criticism of the Robinson-Patman Act's ban on price dis-
crimination is that the Act prevents the market from rewarding more efficient
distribution systems. The HMO and PPO are alternative forms of delivering
health care. Their greater efficiency, when compared to a traditional BCBS
plan, stems partly from the creation of incentives to eliminate the moral hazard
that leads to unnecessary care.153 One of the mechanisms used is to tie the
provider's compensation to the HMO's profit. For example, twenty percent of
the provider's compensation may be withheld and paid only if the HMO's costs
are less than revenues.154 If the MFN clause prevents such mechanisms from
being used, it prevents the establishment of a more efficient distribution system.
Similarly, an HMO or PPO may reduce informational costs, transactional
costs, and the risk associated with the consumer's choice of providers.155 Alter-
native delivery systems can reduce these costs by acting as an informed purchas-
148. 883 F.2d 1101 (Ist Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1473 (1990).
149. Id. at 1111 n.l1.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1111. In fact, lower costs unaccompanied by lower prices is a manifestation of mar-
ket power. See P. AREEDA & L. KAPLOW, ANTITRUsT ANALYSIS 338 (4th ed. 1988).
152. See supra text accompanying note 82.
153. See Frech, supra note 36, at 355; Havighurst, supra note 37, at 24849.
154. See Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of R.I., 883
F.2d 1101, 1104 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1473 (1990).
155. See Frech, supra note 36, at 361-64; Havighurst, supra note 37, at 230-31.
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ing agent for consumers. Rather than each consumer shopping for providers
who will offer the desired level of care at a competitive price, it may be more
efficient to have the HMO or PPO act as the consumer's centralized purchasing
agent. In contrast, the traditional BCBS plan requires each consumer to choose
providers.
The HMO or PPO also may offer advantages from the provider's perspec-
tive. It may reduce risk by guaranteeing a certain volume of patients. Further-
more, it may reduce costs by limiting paperwork or otherwise reducing the time
the provider must spend on each patient. 156 An MFN clause, however, prevents
such efficiencies from being transformed into lower costs and negates any mar-
keting advantage due to the more efficient distribution system.
By preventing more efficient distribution systems from being rewarded by
free market forces, MFN clauses prevent competition on the merits. Ironically,
the First Circuit in Ocean State concluded that prohibiting price discrimination
"tends to further competition on the merits." 157 The court failed to recognize
that some distribution systems may be more efficient than others. 'l'is failure is
particularly perplexing given the court's finding that "Ocean State provided
more coverage and charged lower premiums" than BCBSRI. 158 Just as chain
stores may be more efficient buyers and distributors of groceries, HMOs and
PPOs may be more efficient buyers and distributors of health care services. Any
legal requirement that all buyers invariably must pay the same price to suppliers
or providers prevents competition on the merits from rewarding the more effi-
cient system.
C. The Anticompetitive Potential of Most Favored Nations Clauses Compared
to the Robinson-Patman Act
Although criticisms of the Robinson-Patman Act's ban on price discrimina-
tion can be applied to an MFN clause's ban on price discrimination, the an-
ticompetitive potential of the MFN clause is far greater than the anticompetitive
potential of the Robinson-Patman Act. Unlike the MFN clause, the Robinson-
Patman Act is not a per se ban on all price discrimination. First, section 2(a) of
the Act bans price discrimination only if "the effect of such discrimination may
be... to injure, destroy, or prevent competition .... ,159 As the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently noted: "A controversy has
raged (and continues to rage) over the meaning of 'competition' as used in the
so-called 'competitive injury' phrase of section 2(a)." 160 For purposes of this
Article, it is unnecessary to review that controversy.16 1 Regardless of the exact
156. See Remarks, supra note 12, at 22.
157. Ocean State, 883 F.2d at 1110.
158. Id. at 1103.
159. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988).
160. Alan's of Atlanta, Inc. v. Minolta Corp., 903 F.2d 1414, 1418 n.6 (1lth Cir. 1990) (citing
Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 837 F.2d 1127, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1988); id. at 1148-52 (Williams, J.,
concurring); id. at 1152-63 (Mikva, J., dissenting)).
161. For a discussion of the issues, see AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF ANTITRUST
LAW, supra note 133, at 72-74, 97-105.
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contours of the competitive injury element, it is undisputed that, unlike MFN
clauses, the Robinson-Patman Act's reach is limited to price discriminations
that may injure competition.
Second, the Act includes a defense for cost-justified price differentials. 162
For example, if one customer buys products from a manufacturer in large quan-
tities, thereby reducing per-unit shipping costs, the manufacturer may lower the
price to that customer accordingly. Under an MFN clause, however, price dif-
ferences that reflect cost differences are prohibited. Thus, even if it costs a pro-
vider less to deal with an HMO or PPO than with BCBS, an MFN clause
prevents price differences that simply reflect that cost savings.163
A third provision of the Robinson-Patman Act that diminishes its anticom-
petitive potential is the defense for the good-faith meeting of competition.' 6"
The meeting-competition defense allows a seller to offer lower prices to select
customers if those lower prices were offered in response to "an equally low price
of a competitor." 165 For example, if hospital A offered a twenty percent dis-
count to an HMO, then, consistent with the Robinson-Patman Act, hospital B
could also offer a twenty percent discount to the HMO without also offering the
discount to BCBS. Under an MFN clause, however, hospital B would have to
forego competing for the HMO's business unless it chose to also give the twenty
percent discount to BCBS. Therefore, compared to the Robinson-Patman Act,
an MFN clause places greater limitations on competitive pricing responses and
is more likely to lead to price uniformity.
The competitive injury requirement, the cost-justification defense, and the
meeting-competition defense are only three of the many ways in which the reach
of the Robinson-Patman Act has been limited. 166 No such limits apply to MFN
clauses.167 Moreover, in enacting the Robinson-Patman Act, Congress was
driven by the desire to provide fairness and equality of opportunity to small
business.168 While there is room for disagreement as to how much, if any,
weight society should give to such goals, it is appropriate for Congress to make
such judgments. Thus, criticism of the anticompetitive effects of limiting price
162. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988) ("differentials which make only due allowance for differences in
the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which
such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered").
163. See supra text accompanying note 156.
164. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1988).
165. Id. For a discussion of the defense, see Falls City Indus., Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460
U.S. 428, 43847 (1983).
166. Other limitations on the Act's reach include requirements that the transactions involved be
"sales" to "two different purchasers" of "commodities" of "like grade and quality" in "interstate
commerce" and that the lower price be "unavailable" to the disfavored customer. 15 U.S.C. § 13.
For a discussion of these and other limits on the Act, see Scher, How Sellers Can Live With the
Robinson-Patman Act, 41 Bus. LAW. 533 (1986).
167. See 6 P. AREEDA, supra note 34, at 230.
168. See FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 520 (1963); FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 46
(1948); Silcox & Maclntyre, The Robinson-Patman Act and Competitive Fairness: Balancing the
Economic and Social Dimensions of Antitrust, 31 ANTrrRusT BULL. 611 (1986). It is also the pre-
rogative of Congress to enact special interest protectionist legislation, while private conduct with
similar results may be illegal. See Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. National Elec. Contractors Ass'n,
Inc., 1987-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,462, at 59,936-38 (7th Cir. 1987).
[Vol. 69
MOST FAVORED NATIONS CLA USES
discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act must be tempered by the Act's
fostering of other social values. No such tempering of criticism is appropriate
for privately imposed MFN clauses.
V. CONCLUSIONS
When the FTC challenged the use of MFN clauses in the Ethyl case,169 the
defendants argued that MFN clauses were consistent with the Robinson-Patman
Act.1 70 It is not surprising that the FTC, which is charged with enforcing the
Robinson-Patman Act, would be reluctant to say that the Act often has an-
ticompetitive consequences and that the similarity between the Act and MFN
clauses may indicate that MFN clauses also have anticompetitive conse-
quences1 71" Instead, the FTC rejected the defendant's argument because, unlike
MFN clauses, the Robinson-Patman Act's reach is limited in various ways, in-
cluding cost-justification and meeting-competition defenses.172
In reversing the FTC, the Second Circuit used the Robinson-Patman Act's
prohibition of price discrimination to give legitimacy to MFN clauses. 173 It is
perplexing, however, that the Second Circuit summarily concluded. that the sim-
ilarity of the Act and MFN clauses conferred competitive legitimacy on MFN
clauses. Also baffling is the failure of subsequent cases in the health care indus-
try to transfer the economic criticism of the Robinson-Patman Act's ban on
price discrimination to MFN clauses. In fact, there is no indication that the
courts were even aware of the extensive literature critical of the Robimson-Pat-
man Act.174
It is possible that, in certain circumstances, MFN clauses will result in
lower prices spreading to those who otherwise would pay more. However, it is
also possible that, in certain circumstances, MFN clauses will discourage dis-
counting, facilitate oligopolistic pricing, and deter entry or expansion by more
efficient distribution systems. With the exceptions of the FTC in Ethyl 175 and
the Tenth Circuit in Reazin,17 6 the courts have held that MFN clauses are not
anticompetitive as a matter of law. Although there is a compelling simplicity to
the argument that lower prices will flow from MFN clauses, extensive economic
analysis of the Robinson-Patman Act indicates that MFN clauses have substan-
169. In re Ethyl Corp., 101 F.T.C. 425 (1983), rev'd sub nom. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984).
170. See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
171. The FTC, however, has "declined to use Section 5 [of the FTC Act] to extend the [Robin-
son-Patman] Act's reach, where the effect would be in conflict with the competition goals of the
antitrust laws." In re Boise Cascade Corp., 107 F.T.C. 76, 205 (1986) (citing In re General Motors
Corp., 103 F.T.C. 641, 700-01 (1984)), rev'd on other grounds and remanded, 837 F.2d 1127 (D.C.
Cir. 1988).
172. See supra text acZompanying note 24.
173. See supra text accompanying note 32.
174. See supra notes 130 & 133.
175. In re Ethyl Corp., 101 F.T.C. 425 (1983), rev'd sub nom. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v.
FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984).
176. Reazin v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 899 F.2d 951 (10th Cir.), cerL denied,
110 S. Ct. 3241 (1990).
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tial anticompetitive potential. In an era when economic analysis has reshaped
much of antitrust law, the treatment of MFN clauses stands out as an anomaly.
